THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS IN THE METHODOLOGIES OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES IN GADAMER'S PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract. After the natural sciences achieved remarkable accomplishments following their liberation from the authority of the Church and the adoption of the scientific method, other sciences hastened to emulate them in the hope of attaining similar results, including the human sciences. As a result, numerous studies in the human sciences emerged; however, they remained unable to keep pace with the advancements realised by science, leading to a crisis within the human sciences. Amidst this conflict, hermeneutics appeared as a methodology of understanding capable of studying the human sciences objectively, since the human phenomenon requires interpretation, in contrast to the natural sciences, which demand explanation. The discussion regarding the problem of methodology in the human sciences resurfaced after proponents of the scientific method succeeded in overturning the dominance of the Church and liberating thought from the control of the clergy. The earliest signs of the methodological crisis in the human sciences appeared with the emergence of the conflict between qualitative methodologies and positivist methodologies in the quest for truth. The human phenomenon did not attract the attention of researchers until the nineteenth century, as all interests had previously focused on nature. Consequently, the human sciences found themselves facing a dilemma: either to adopt the scientific method in the hope of achieving results similar to those of the natural sciences or to develop a methodology suited to their nature. This conflict persisted until the human sciences had the opportunity to forge their path and free themselves from dependence on the natural sciences, after which it became evident that the methodologies used in the sciences were limited in their applicability to human phenomena owing to the distinct nature of each.

Keywords: human sciences, crisis, understanding, explanation, interpretation

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ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ И МЕТАФИЗИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВАНИЯ В МЕТОДОЛОГИЯХ ГУМАНИТАРНЫХ НАУК В ФИЛОСОФИИ ГАДАМЕРА

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Абстракт. После того как естественные науки добились значительных успехов благодаря освобождению от власти Церкви и принятию научного метода, другие науки, в том числе гуманитарные, поспешили следовать их примеру в надежде достичь аналогичных результатов. В результате появилось множество исследований в области гуманитарных наук, однако они не смогли сравниться по достижениям с естественными науками, что привело к кризису в гуманитарной сфере. В этом контексте герменевтика заявила о себе как о методологии понимания, способной объективно изучать гуманитарные науки, поскольку человеческий феномен требует интерпретации, в отличие от природных явлений, которые требуют объяснения.Вопрос методологии в гуманитарных науках вновь стал актуальным после того, как сторонникам научного метода удалось устранить господство Церкви и освободить мышление от контроля духовенства. Первые признаки методологического кризиса в гуманитарных науках появились с возникновением конфликта между качественными методологиями и позитивистскими подходами в поисках истины. Человеческий феномен привлёк внимание исследователей лишь в XIX веке, тогда как ранее всё внимание было сосредоточено на природе. В итоге гуманитарные науки оказались перед дилеммой: либо принять научный метод в надежде на сопоставимые результаты, либо разработать собственную, соответствующую их природе методологию. Этот конфликт продолжался до тех пор, пока гуманитарные науки не начали выстраивать собственный путь, освободившись от зависимости от естественных наук. Тогда стало ясно, что методологии, применяемые в науках о природе, ограничены в своей применимости к человеческим феноменам, ввиду их различной природы.

Ключевые слова: гуманитарные науки, кризис, понимание, объяснение, интерпретация

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*QADAMER FƏLSƏFƏSİ*NDƏ HUMANİTAR ELMLƏRİN METODOLOGİYALARINDA EPİSTEMOLOJİ VƏ METAFİZİK ƏSASLAR

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Abstrakt. Təbiət elmləri kilsənin nüfuzundan azad olduqdan və elmi metodu qəbul etdikdən sonra mühüm nailiyyətlər əldə etdilər. Bu uğurların ardınca digər elmlər, o cümlədən humanitar elmlər də bu metodları təqlid etməyə çalışdılar ki, oxşar nəticələr əldə edə bilsinlər. Nəticədə humanitar elmlər sahəsində bir çox tədqiqatlar meydana gəlsə də, bu elmlər təbiət elmlərinin əldə etdiyi tərəqqiyə çata bilmədilər və nəticədə humanitar elmlərdə bir böhran yarandı. Bu qarşıdurma şəraitində hermenevtika, insan elmlərini obyektiv şəkildə öyrənə bilən bir anlama metodologiyası kimi ortaya çıxdı. Belə ki, insan fenomeni izahdan çox şərh və təfsir tələb edir, təbiət elmləri isə əsasən izah verməyə yönəlmişdir. Humanitar elmlərdə metodologiya problemi ilə bağlı müzakirələr, elmi metod tərəfdarlarının kilsənin hökmranlığını aradan qaldırıb düşüncəni ruhanilərin nəzarətindən azad etməsindən sonra yenidən gündəmə gəldi. Humanitar elmlərdə metodoloji böhranın ilk əlamətləri keyfiyyət metodologiyaları ilə pozitivist metodologiyalar arasında həqiqət axtarışı zəminində baş verən toqquşmalarla ortaya çıxdı. İnsan fenomeni tədqiqatçıların diqqətini yalnız XIX əsrdə cəlb etdi; ondan əvvəlki dövrlərdə bütün diqqət təbiətə yönəlmişdi. Bu səbəbdən humanitar elmlər bir seçim qarşısında qaldılar: ya təbiət elmlərinin metodlarını tətbiq edib eyni nəticələri əldə etməyə çalışmaq, ya da özlərinə uyğun metodologiya formalaşdırmaq. Bu qarşıdurma uzun müddət davam etdi, ta ki humanitar elmlər öz yolunu tapıb təbiət elmlərindən asılılıqdan azad olana qədər. Nəticədə məlum oldu ki, elm sahələrində istifadə olunan metodologiyalar insan fenomeninə tətbiq oluna bilmir, çünki insan və təbiət fenomenləri mahiyyətcə fərqlidir.

Açar sözlər: humanitar elmlər, böhran, anlama, izah, təfsir

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1.Introduction

Amidst this debate, hermeneutics emerged as an alternative framework for studying human phenomena with greater objectivity on the basis that interpretation constitutes a methodology of understanding, which aligns with the nature of the human sciences. The following question thus arises: Has hermeneutics succeeded in establishing itself as an alternative to the experimental method for studying the human sciences?

2.Understanding and Beginnings of Methodological Foundation

Through his hermeneutic project, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) sought to establish general hermeneutics as the art of understanding a universal field despite the numerous separate branches of hermeneutics. He emphasised that, in essence, this art is a singular discipline, regardless of the diversity of texts it addresses, whether religious, legislative, or literary. What unites these branches is a linguistic body, wherein the linguistic structure forms the meaning, irrespective of textual differences. Thus, hermeneutics lies in formulating principles for all linguistic understanding.

The process of expressing any utterance in the form of words differs from the process of receiving and understanding that utterance. Thought and language constitute an inseparable systematic unity, and the perception of the subject always passes through language. Therefore, the interpretive process cannot be complete, nor can understanding be fulfilled, without the ultimate union between the two forms of interpretation, its linguistic and technical forms [Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 1987, p.24]. Within this dialogical process, understanding occurs, as dialogue brings together a speaker who constructs sentences to express what they wish to say and a listener who seeks to comprehend those words. This pursuit involves delving into the depths of the idea expressed through words and analysing the psychological processes of the speaker that lie hidden behind those words.

From this duality, Schleiermacher distinguished between language, which falls within the domain of linguistic interpretation, and thought, which pertains to the psychological-technical domain. General linguistic rules govern the psychological interpretation process in terms of what is subjective.

Suppose that the interpreter understands the author's psychological structure. In that case, understanding will proceed directly and positively: "*Linguistic interpretation lies in distancing the true meaning of a set of discourses through the aid of language*" [Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 1987, p.77]. Every author imprints their mark upon their language, and it is impossible to understand an utterance apart from the personal nature of its author. Thus, the art of understanding transcends the mere focus on the linguistic rules of dialogue to encompass the personal, psychological and conceptual structure of the author.

The art of understanding is based on the synthesis of the whole with its parts, as understanding a text necessitates comprehending all its parts through reliance on the whole.

Building upon Schleiermacher's achievements, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) sought to establish a distinct scientific methodology for the human sciences, independent of the natural sciences, aiming to find an epistemology specific to the sciences of thought to liberate hermeneutics from the historical perspective and psychological tendencies that prevailed in the nineteenth century [Barra, 2008, p.179].

The authors noted that the difference between the natural and social sciences lies in the fact that the subject matter of the social sciences is given and not derived from anything external to them. In contrast, the natural sciences are derived from nature. Furthermore, sociologists are required to understand social phenomena by studying the social structure itself and by experiencing social events from within, rather than from without. This cannot be achieved through the methodologies of the natural sciences, as they require explanation. In contrast, the human sciences demand understanding and interpretation because "*we understand human life and explain nature*" [Sharqi, 2007, p.32].

By reconsidering the subject of understanding and shifting its focus from the study of natural phenomena to the study of the human being internally as an individual phenomenon and externally about historical events, Dil sought to liberate hermeneutics from both historical and psychological tendencies. This points to a new perspective on the human sciences, distinct from the theory of interpretation in ancient times, which confined its task to interpreting specific and specialised subjects, such as religious and philological texts.

The epistemological development of hermeneutics into a methodology for the human sciences and the integration of interpretation into the epistemology of studying the human phenomenon led Dilthey to construct a new epistemological foundation. He combined historical experience with the German idealist tradition, naming it the "critique of historical reason".

After DiI distinguished between the natural and human sciences, the paradigm shifted with Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) from the duality of nature and the science of spirit to the duality of technique and the human being. Whereas they viewed the human being as being composed of both spiritual and rational elements, Husserl also attributed a social character to the human being. This necessitated "the inauguration of a positivist knowledge concerning the human being, and consequently, the completion of this work now that the natural sciences have largely entered the positivist phase, which is not the case for the science of the human being" [Drouin & Weil, 2012, p.31]. Thus, the human sciences came to denote all disciplines produced by human consciousness.

What particularly attracted Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) in Husserl's thought was the concept of "intentionality," that is, the return to the things themselves. The objects of study within the realm of experience only appear through what is present to the researcher's consciousness, whereas other aspects remain absent.

The methodological crisis for Husserl represented an extension of the crisis in the sciences that emerged amid the conflict between proponents of positivism, who regarded subjects through an empirical lens, and advocates of subjectivism, who sought to free the human sciences from this crisis. This attempt led to an even more profound crisis, as when the experimental method is applied to the human sciences, the human being becomes merely one event among the events of nature. In this way, these sciences lose their significance when they neglect questions related to human existence. "The crisis does not reside in the manner in which the sciences have defined their tasks and, on this basis on this, constructed their methodologies" [Husserl, 2008, p.471].

By neglecting questions related to meaning, that is, questions concerning the self, history, and ethics, the crisis of the sciences came to reflect a crisis in the self-understanding of human beings. When the sciences distanced themselves from the profound issues about the human subject and limited themselves to addressing the highest problems of human existence, they overlooked the fundamental issue upon which phenomenology was founded, namely, the "understanding of existence." Phenomenology thus offered hermeneutics a solution, through its methodology, to the problems of classical interpretative practice, which relied on extracting religious meanings from the ready-made meanings of letters in the Holy Scriptures. The existence of understanding as a phenomenological given became a driving force for human beings to discover their self and their lived world. "Conversely, hermeneutics rescued phenomenology from the authority of transcendence and the illusions of idealism upon which it was based, bringing it into the domain of interpreting existence through the search for intended meaning" [Barra, 2008, p.196].

Husserl's aim in founding his methodology was to save the human sciences from the experimental method, which was based on scientific models and sought to understand the human sciences. However, Husserl believed that the human sciences could comprehend their subjects with greater precision through philosophical reflection, offering a depth beyond that of scientific-technical thinking, which had stripped science of human consciousness.

Husserl's phenomenology was transformed into ontology with Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). The focus of inquiry shifted from the conditions necessary for a person to understand any text to questioning the very being of the person who understands. With Heidegger, hermeneutics became a field for the analysis of *Dasein*, whereby understanding became a mode of the existence

of this *Dasein*. Heidegger began his project by stating that "science does not think" [Heidegger, 1995, p.192], as science observes only what is observable. He then proceeded to critique metaphysics and its subjectivism, which glorified the human being and regarded it as the centre of existence and the sole agent of knowledge. This, in turn, diminished the stature of existence and rendered it merely subordinate to human subjectivity. "While Husserlian phenomenology believes that the world exists only through self-knowledge and regards this existence as perceptual and cognitive, produced and bestowed by consciousness or the self, Heidegger asserts that existence or the world is the entirely hidden and forgotten prisoner" [Sharqi, 2007, p.106].

With Heidegger, hermeneutics became an expression of the meaning of the phenomena of human existence, which require interpretation because they are not given directly. This expression concerns "Aletheia," which allows for the interpretation of being and for truth to be revealed, as it is part of the human being's lived world. To understand truth, one is required to engage in dialogue with its various manifestations. Such a dialogue reveals the internal conscious structure that lies behind every human activity and reflects the experiences of others within the shared world. Thus, understanding assumes the complete form required for the fulfilment of *Dasein* as being-in-the-world: "Understanding is a mode of the existence of Dasein, which encompasses the knowledge and possibility of being" [Maaqah, 2010, p.80].

By reviving the question of existence, understanding for Heidegger ceased to be merely a cognitive process. Instead, it took the form of the very origin of human life itself, that is, the ability of *Dasein* to perceive its existence in the world into which it has been thrown, with every being constituting a part of its existence. Thus, understanding also becomes a mode of being founded upon the act of interpretation and all interpretative actions. This is the ontological dimension of understanding, which is intrinsically linked to existence, for human consciousness is what enables it to comprehend being through the experiences encountered in this world. Humans are, in essence, a network of relationships, and through the realisation of their existence, the world is revealed to them. Subjective experience forms the basis of knowledge and is an insurmountable condition: "And it is only human beings who possess the world... It is through perceiving their existence that they perceive the world, as the world reveals itself to them or when they allow things to appear" [Abu Zayd, 2004, p.33].

3.Truth and the Problem of Method

Gadamer's thought began to take shape under the influence of Greek philosophy; he admired the way Aristotle read Plato's texts and was inspired by Plato's dialogues to develop the dialogical concept of understanding. While Schleiermacher previously attempted to codify interpretative practice, Dilthey

linked interpretive understanding to psychology, and Heidegger considered hermeneutics as the realisation of the fundamental mechanisms of human existence, hermeneutics in Gadamer's philosophy assumed a new form, even though it remained an extension of Heidegger's interpretation, especially as both converge in their critique of classical hermeneutics. Gadamer held that the problem of understanding does not reside in the method that leads to it but in the very understanding of understanding itself. Here, Heidegger's significant influence on Gadamer is evident, as is the extension of the ontological dimension of the process of understanding from the former to the latter. Gadamer states, "This concept led me to move beyond discussing issues associated with the critique of method, to broaden the issue of interpretation beyond the field of science and to incorporate the experiences of imagination and history" [Gadamer, 2006, p.175], that is, the interpretation of understanding in its essence, after a radical reconfiguration of hermeneutics and a break with previous interpretations.

Gadamer seeks to reveal the limited role of methods, as there is nothing to suggest a necessary link between methods and understanding. Understanding, as a human activity, transcends all methodology, and hermeneutics, as ontology, is more concerned with the conditions of understanding than with its rules and principles.

Gadamer's hermeneutics aims to transcend the methodological character of truth in the field of human sciences, since the method only answers the questions it poses; all its answers are already implicitly contained within it, and there is no hope of reaching anything new beyond what was presupposed. Thus, the method does not lead to truth; instead, it leads the practitioner to their truth: "By working to approach the subject by freeing the self from its illusions and providing it with an existential foundation that establishes truth" [Amara, 2007, p.14].

Understanding cannot be subjected to the experimental method because it originates from the self. Although the method in the experimental sciences has achieved success, in the human sciences, truth cannot be the product of method; rather, it is the outcome of understanding the lived world. Hence, hermeneutics is an experience of truth and an attempt to understand the truth of the human sciences by transcending our self-awareness.

Truth in the realm of the human sciences is not linked to the scientific method, as the human sciences are connected to experiences beyond the scope of science, philosophical, artistic, literary, and historical experiences. These experiences cannot be verified through a scientific experimental method, as it is incapable of answering many of the questions they raise, and the difficulty of finding answers prevents inquiry into such topics. "Hermeneutics, as the

understanding of understanding, does not exist as a science; rather, there are only a multitude of separate branches of hermeneutics" [Mustafa, 2007, p.97]. Thus, the method does not encompass truth; in contrast, truth not only encompasses method but can also transcend it. Truth, as Heidegger asserted, is the revelation of history and tradition through the questions of the present; it is the fusion of the present with the horizon of history and tradition. Tradition should not be viewed as something external to us, for we are situated within it. The task of hermeneutics is to open a dialogue between the past and the present, and dialogical interaction must continually renew the elements of the problematic, as priority is given to the question over the structure of understanding.

This interpretative practice is what Gadamer calls understanding and, consequently, truth does not require a method but rather a solution that allows for the posing of questions and awaiting answers: "The interlocutor must not be committed in any of his positions against the claim he is trying to establish, for if he is, he is essentially judging his own claim to be invalid from his own point of view" [Al-Khafaji, 2016, p.265].

Dialogue allows the subject matter to move freely; that is, it allows topics to open up their own accord. In contrast, methodological knowledge is cast into a mould predetermined by method, portraying the superiority of the subject over its object.

Since hermeneutics, as the philosophy of understanding in Gadamer's view, transcends superficial readings of texts, truth is embedded in the depths of the text. It rejects the reduction of understanding and, with it, truth to mere rules akin to those governing scientific knowledge. Gadamer does not consider hermeneutics to be a methodology for the human sciences but rather "an attempt to understand what truth is and what connects it to the totality of our experience in the world" [Amara, 2007, p.22]. It is grounded in understanding and dialogue, for understanding cannot be conceived without dialogue, using which the self opens up to the subject matter.

The human sciences raise a philosophical problem concerning truth within scientific knowledge. For this reason, Gadamer sought to present the interpretive process in its reflective form, asserting that it is not a methodology for the human sciences, as its task is not to construct fixed knowledge: "The phenomenon is fundamentally not a problem of method at all; it initially concerns knowledge, established to meet the demands of the methodological model of science, even though it is also concerned with knowledge and truth" [Gadamer, 2007, p.27].

Hermeneutics, then, is an attempt to understand the truth of the sciences and to enter into dialogue with the human sciences to simulate the experience of truth, which transcends any field subject to scientific methods, since the human

sciences are connected to experiences beyond science. The value of truth within the various branches of the human sciences cannot be verified through scientific experimentation, as it concerns evaluative, nonmeasurable forms of knowledge.

3.1.Question of Prejudice

The most important step in obtaining objective historical knowledge is to purify it from interpretation on the basis of prejudices. It is not objective to judge a particular historical era using the standards of another era; what is required in history is equally necessary in the literature, as it is not possible to judge literary work from a specific period using literary mechanisms from another period. "The historian today is more than ever required to question the act of (historical) writing, especially after the emergence of linguistic theories and studies, which have clarified the methodological horizon and highlighted the close relationship between historical and fictional writing" [Abdeloui, 2009, p.69].

Judgment of any work is not to be made solely from the perspective of the text's aesthetics or truth but through posing questions inspired by the present after the questioner projects themselves onto the work. Prejudices play a prominent role in understanding history, as it is impossible to understand historical events without prior assumptions because understanding them always involves a presupposition that can be reconsidered. Understanding on the basis of such presupposition implies that what is understood remains subject to reinterpretation whenever these prejudices re-emerge.

Gadamer maintains that the attempt to eliminate subjectivity leads to a distortion of the objectivity of interpretation, as subjectivity is the starting point for our understanding of both the past and the present.

Prejudices arise from tradition, which presents historical facts as subjects for the mind to contemplate to understand its relationship with the present, since the meaning of a text is related to the present and is the product of the interpretative process. Understanding is the art of translating the truths of tradition, applying them, and merging them into the crucible of current issues by reviving obscured meanings, uncovering latent knowledge, and resurrecting ideas that have been suppressed, forgotten, or lost in recesses of language. This indicates that the movement of history or historical activity forms us as historical beings to the same extent that we make history through the will to understand and the 'ethics' of understanding and dialogue" [Gadamer, 2006, p.23]. The actual task of hermeneutics lies in the conflict between the present and the past, where temporal experience discards what is accidental in preserving what is genuine. Even if some prejudices are set aside, others are invoked, which can lead to a correct understanding.

The text is understood by projecting its historical meaning onto the present; the relationship between the interpreter and the text does not compel the interpreter to step outside their era but rather to address the text from the standpoint of their own time. The interpreter is required to understand the text, not the author, and is expected to set aside both their subjectivity and that of the author: "In other words, they seek to become active subjects in history rather than merely its passive objects, which has been their role until now" [Eliade, 2007, p.49]. Here, the primary task of hermeneutics is evident in how it integrates the past with the present by posing questions to the past from the perspective of the present. Interpretation is not limited to explaining the meanings of the text within its world but rather extends to the present. This does not entail simply recalling the text from the past but instead bringing the essence of the past into our self-understanding so that history remains continually active and our knowledge of the past is not reduced to mere distortions that misrepresent its reality.

4.Tools of Interpretation

Gadamer's hermeneutics is regarded as an alternative to scientific methodologies, having demonstrated that much knowledge can be apprehended outside the framework of the scientific method. In his book *"Truth and Method*," Gadamer outlined tools that act as mediators to bring the concept of interpretation closer.

4.1.The Aesthetic Circle

The aesthetic circle introduces the concept of interpretation within the field of artistic experience, beginning from aesthetic consciousness. In this context, Gadamer attributes a different dimension to the interpretation of the human sciences: the dimension of artistic intuition, which replaces the methodology of scientific inquiry. Knowledge, therefore, is understood subjectively within the authority of the rich heritage of human history. The self imposes its rules and tools upon the subject matter; thus, the self does not understand the subject as it is presented through experience but interprets it according to its conceptions. "The legitimacy of a particular aesthetic judgement cannot be derived from or proven by any universal principle, nor does anyone presume that matters of taste can be decided by judgement or argumentation" [Gadamer, 2007, p.98]. The experience of truth influences the individual, be it religious, philosophical, or social, through artistic dialogue, as truth transcends the truth of methodological knowledge. Beyond the pleasure offered by a work of art, it is regarded as an encounter with truth, for art is understood through the experience of life, and the experience of truth in the artistic work derives from the work itself. Gadamer refers, in the process of actualising the artwork, to "the particular historical consciousness," which requires that hermeneutic

consciousness be broader than aesthetic consciousness to reach an appropriate understanding.

Gadamer links the aesthetic circle and historical hermeneutics to understanding and interpretation; without understanding, neither the aesthetics nor the historicity of a text can be simulated. "*He has, in accordance with historical consciousness and the art of interpretation, shown that for each matter individually, understanding guided by methodological awareness must not only carry out its preconceptions but also monitor them by making them conscious, in order to obtain correct understanding on the basis of the things themselves*" [Gadamer, 2006, p.125].

4.2.Linguistic Circle

Understanding is connected to language on the one hand and to interpretation on the other hand; this makes the relationship between these concepts transitive, meaning that obstacles in linguistic expression affect both understanding and interpretation. According to Gadamer, a poor expression of an idea is the result of misunderstanding it from the outset. This explains methodological errors in historical writings, which are due to the language of the author rather than the text itself. "Writing is a kind of self-alienation, and overcoming it that is, reading the text is the highest task of understanding. Even the mere signs of an inscription can be specifically examined and correctly analysed if the text can be translated into language. As we have said, such translation in any case establishes a relationship with what the text always means, that is, with the subject being discussed. Here, the process of understanding moves entirely towards the world of meaning generated by the linguistic tradition" [Gadamer, 2007, p.513].

5.Conclusion

Hermeneutics, in essence, is not a methodology but rather an art of understanding and interpretation. The human phenomenon inherently carries significance and meaning, even if it shares with the natural phenomenon the pursuit of truth. For this reason, Gadamer insisted on the notions of dialogue and effective historical consciousness so that humans might acquire a desire to search for truth and openness to the future. The human sciences are linked to the self, which is in turn related to tradition. This led Gadamer to introduce a phenomenological dimension to the field of hermeneutics in his quest for the ontological truth of understanding within tradition, using the mechanisms of the present era. The pursuit of truth cannot take place outside human culture or far from lived reality, so truth ceases to be merely an idea that corresponds to its object and becomes an idea open to new possibilities.

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